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INCOMPETENT PLEA BARGAINING  
AND EXTRAJUDICIAL REFORMS 
Stephanos Bibas∗ 
For many years, plea bargaining has been a gray market.  Courts 
are rarely involved, leaving prosecutors unconstrained by judges or  
juries.1  Prosecutors’ plea offers largely set sentences, checked only by 
defense lawyers.  In this laissez-faire bargaining system, defense law-
yers, not judges or juries, are the primary guarantors of fair bargains 
and equal treatment for their clients.2  But the quality of defense law-
yering varies widely.  Bargaining can be a shadowy process, influenced 
not only by the strength of the evidence and the seriousness of the 
crime but also by irrelevant factors such as counsel’s competence, 
compensation, and zeal.3  And because bargaining takes place off the 
record and is conveyed to clients in confidence, it is not easy to verify 
that defense counsel have represented their clients zealously and  
effectively. 
Nevertheless, criminal procedure has long focused on jury trials.  
Even though guilty pleas resolve roughly ninety-five percent of adju-
dicated criminal cases,4 the Supreme Court has usually treated plea 
bargaining as an afterthought, doing little to regulate it.5  When it has 
regulated pleas, the Court has largely focused on the procedures for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law and Criminology and Director, Supreme Court Clinic, University of Penn-
sylvania Law School.  Thanks to Rick Bierschbach for advice and comments on earlier drafts. 
 1 For a survey of these and other objections to plea bargaining, see Albert W. Alschuler, Im-
plementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932–34 (1983). 
 2 See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Con-
sumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1126, 1143 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the 
Plea-Bargaining Market]; see also Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995) (“Apart 
from the small class of rights that require specific advice from the court under Rule 11(c), it is the 
responsibility of defense counsel to inform a defendant of the advantages and disadvantages of a 
plea agreement and the attendant statutory and constitutional rights that a guilty plea would for-
go.”). 
 3 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2469–86 (2004). 
 4 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl. 5.24.2010, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf 
/t5242010.pdf (reporting that guilty pleas resolved ninety-seven percent of adjudicated federal 
criminal cases in fiscal year 2010, excluding dismissals); id. tbl. 5.46.2006, http://www.albany 
.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf (reporting that ninety-four percent of state felony convictions in 
2006 resulted from guilty pleas). 
 5 E.g., MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER 179 (2005) (“The plea bargaining 
process is governed by very few, if any, principles, with the blessing of the Supreme Court which 
has turned a blind constitutional eye.”). 
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waiving trial rights, not the substantive pros and cons of striking a 
deal.6  This past Term, the Court for the first time addressed how the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel applies 
to defendants who reject bargains and receive heavier sentences after 
fair trials.  In Lafler v. Cooper7 and Missouri v. Frye,8 a five-to-four 
majority of the Court held that ineffectiveness that leads defendants to 
reject plea bargains can satisfy both the performance and prejudice 
prongs of Strickland v. Washington.9  Incompetent lawyering that 
causes a defendant to reject a plea offer can constitute deficient per-
formance, and the resulting loss of a favorable plea bargain can consti-
tute cognizable prejudice, under the Sixth Amendment.10 
The majority and dissenting opinions almost talked past each other, 
reaching starkly different conclusions because they started from oppos-
ing premises: contemporary and pragmatic versus historical and for-
malist.  The dissenters would have limited the Sixth Amendment to 
the jury trials with which the Framers were concerned and proceed-
ings ancillary to those trials.11  As Justice Scalia put it at oral argu-
ment, a jury trial is “the 24-karat test of fairness,” and defendants who 
fail to plead guilty cannot complain that they received “the best thing 
[that] our legal system” has to offer.12  Justice Kennedy’s majority  
opinions, by contrast, rested heavily on the dominance of plea bargain-
ing today and its central role in setting sentences as well as convic-
tions.  Even a fair trial cannot wipe away an earlier tactical decision 
that results in a much longer sentence after trial.13 
Belatedly, the Court noticed that “ours ‘is for the most part a sys-
tem of pleas, not a system of trials.’”14  The Court, like Rip Van Win-
kle, has at last awoken from its long slumber and sees the vast field it 
has left all but unregulated.15  Justice Scalia, in dissent, repeatedly as-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 2, at 1122–27. 
 7 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 8 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 9 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–10; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384–88. 
 10 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–10; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. 
 11 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The plea-bargaining process is a 
subject worthy of regulation, since it is the means by which most criminal convictions are ob-
tained.  It happens not to be, however, a subject covered by the Sixth Amendment, which is con-
cerned not with the fairness of bargaining but with the fairness of conviction.”); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1393 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s extension of Sixth Amendment pro-
tection to plea bargaining as “a vast departure from our past cases, protecting not just the consti-
tutionally prescribed right to a fair adjudication of guilt and punishment, but a judicially invent-
ed right to effective plea bargaining”). 
 12 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (No. 10-209). 
 13 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388. 
 14 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388). 
 15 I am indebted to Ron Wright for the striking simile.  Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judg-
es in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012, at A12 (“Professor [Ronald F.] Wright 
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sailed the majority for “open[ing] a whole new field of . . . plea-
bargaining law,”16 but it is about time.  Now the big question is which 
institutions can and will ameliorate poor defense lawyering retrospec-
tively or prospectively.  The upshot, I predict, will depend on semi-
private ordering: few reversals in court, but much more prospective ex-
trajudicial reform. 
Lafler and Frye will not cause courts of appeals to invalidate many 
convictions for constitutional error.  Courts are poorly equipped to  
remedy woefully inadequate defense lawyering on their own.  Plea 
bargaining creates little record, after-the-fact review is cumbersome 
and expensive, and courts are reluctant to reverse final judgments, in-
trude on prosecutors’ prerogatives to bargain, or subject defense coun-
sel’s performance to searching review.  Lafler and Frye will loosen the-
se cautions a bit but will not open the floodgates.  Moreover, judges 
cannot fix the massive underfunding and overwork that plague indi-
gent defense counsel.  The good news is that Lafler and Frye will 
probably have much bigger effects indirectly, in prompting solutions 
beyond the courts.  Plea bargaining’s semiprivatized justice is best 
suited to semiprivatized remedies and reforms, backstopped by judges 
but driven by other actors.  Other actors have the incentives and pow-
er to achieve, prospectively and flexibly, much that after-the-fact judi-
cial review cannot.  In the real world of plea bargaining, the parties’ 
stances are no longer antagonistic.  Counterintuitively, even prosecu-
tors and defendants have strong incentives to collaborate in explaining, 
promoting, and bulletproofing plea bargains. 
Part I summarizes the facts and opinions in Lafler and Frye.  The 
majority’s contemporary, functional analysis rested upon the domi-
nance of plea bargaining today, while the dissenters’ formalistic logic 
idealized the historical jury trial as the Sixth Amendment’s exclusive 
concern.  Part II is largely descriptive and predictive, explaining why 
judges are unlikely to overturn many convictions for violating Lafler 
and Frye.  Though these decisions should apply retroactively even on 
federal habeas review, in practice courts will overturn few pleas, as de-
fense lawyers’ bad advice is hard to prove and judges are understand-
ably skeptical of postconviction appeals.  Finally, Part III begins with 
prediction and analysis and ends with normative assessment of Lafler 
and Frye’s extrajudicial effects.  It predicts that nonjudicial actors (es-
pecially prosecutors) will do much to solve plea bargaining’s problems 
prospectively, explains why they have the incentives to do so, describes 
how they can do it, and finally praises these developments.  While 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
likened the court’s decisions on Wednesday to ‘Rip Van Winkle waking up.  He looks around and 
says, “Wow, when I went to sleep the world was full of trials.”’”). 
 16 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord id. at 1398. 
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courts can do little on their own, they can create incentives for other 
market participants to explain offers and shore up their bargains. 
I.  THE DECISIONS 
A.  The Facts 
Galin Frye had three convictions for driving with a revoked driv-
er’s license and was charged with that offense a fourth time, making it 
a felony punishable by up to four years’ imprisonment.17  The prosecu-
tor sent his defense counsel a letter offering Frye two plea options, one 
of which would have reduced the charge to a misdemeanor with a rec-
ommendation for a ninety-day sentence.  The letter stated that both 
offers would expire on a certain date.  Frye’s lawyer never communi-
cated the offers to Frye, and they expired.  Frye then pleaded guilty 
without a plea agreement and was sentenced to three years’ imprison-
ment.18  On a state motion for postconviction relief, he testified that he 
would have accepted the misdemeanor offer if he had known about it.  
The state trial court denied the motion, but the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals reversed.  It found that Frye was prejudiced by the felony con-
viction and the higher maximum sentence, deemed Frye’s plea with-
drawn, and remanded to allow Frye to insist on a trial or to re-plead 
on whatever terms the prosecutor chose to offer.19 
Anthony Cooper fired a gun at Kali Mundy’s head and missed.20  
As Mundy fled, Cooper pursued her and kept shooting, hitting her in 
the buttock, hip, and abdomen but not killing her.  The State of Mich-
igan charged him with assault with intent to murder, possession of a 
firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm in committing a felony, mis-
demeanor marijuana possession, and being a habitual offender.  Twice 
the State offered to dismiss two charges and recommend a sentence of 
fifty-one to eighty-one months on the others, and Cooper admitted 
guilt and expressed to the court his willingness to accept the offer.  Yet 
Cooper’s lawyer allegedly convinced him that the prosecution could 
not establish his intent to murder because Mundy had been shot below 
the waist.  (That alleged advice was laughably bad.)  Thus, he rejected 
the offer, was convicted at trial, and received the mandatory minimum 
sentence of 185 to 360 months.21  On appeal, the state appeals court 
rejected his claim of ineffective assistance.22  A federal district court 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
 18 Id. at 1404–05. 
 19 Id. at 1405; Frye v. State, 311 S.W.3d 350, 360–61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 20 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. 
 21 Id. 
 22 People v. Cooper, No. 250583, 2005 WL 599740, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2005) (per 
curiam). 
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then granted habeas relief, ordering specific performance of the origi-
nal plea offer despite the deferential standard of review under the  
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 199623 (AEDPA) for 
state convictions.24  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding prejudice in 
Cooper’s lost opportunity to receive a lower sentence.25 
B.  The Court’s Opinions 
1.  The Majority’s Recognition: The Real World of Guilty Pleas. — 
The majority’s approach was at root functional and contemporary.  
The key to understanding the majority is recognizing its realization 
that today, plea bargains resolve roughly ninety-five percent of adjudi-
cated criminal cases.26  “The reality is that plea bargains have become 
so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that de-
fense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . .”27  
Now that “‘horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] de-
termines who goes to jail and for how long[,]’ . . . the negotiation of a 
plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the 
critical point for a defendant.”28  Put another way, the battle today is 
rarely over conviction, which is usually a foregone conclusion, but over 
the sentence.  A defendant has no right to a plea bargain, the Lafler 
majority noted, but once a plea offer is on the table, he has a right to 
reasonably competent counsel to minimize his sentence.29 
Defendants reasonably expect not the maximum sentence, but the 
going rate established by the functioning market, the Court recog-
nized.30  “The expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few 
percent of cases.  It is like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, 
ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything 
less as a bargain.”31  Now that trials are atypical, plea bargains are the 
norm.  Legislatures authorize and prosecutors threaten long post-trial 
sentences as bargaining chips to be exchanged for pleas.  Defendants 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 24 Cooper v. Lafler, No. 06-11068, 2009 WL 817712, at *5–10 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2009). 
 25 Lafler v. Cooper, 376 F. App’x 563, 573 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 26 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (ninety-four percent of state convictions and ninety-seven percent of 
federal convictions); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, tbl. 5.24.2010; id. tbl. 
5.46.2006. 
 27 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
 28 Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargain-
ing as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
 29 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387; see also Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) 
(“[A]ny amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.”), quoted with approv-
al in Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386. 
 30 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387. 
 31 Id. (quoting Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 2, at 1138) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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who take their chances and are convicted at trial thus receive longer 
sentences than equally culpable defendants who plead guilty.32 
The majority refused to limit the right to effective counsel to trials 
and proceedings leading up to them.  In Lafler, the petitioner and the 
Solicitor General argued forcefully that the Sixth Amendment’s sole 
purpose is to protect the fairness of trials and the reliability of post-
trial convictions.33  On that view, the touchstone of prejudice would be 
whether a trial was unreliable — whether it risked convicting an inno-
cent defendant.  The majority reasoned, however, that the right to ef-
fective counsel extends to sentencing and comprehends any less favor-
able outcome, whether conviction or sentence.  A heavier sentence can 
amount to cognizable prejudice, even if it flows from a fair trial.34  So, 
fair trials do not wash away all constitutional errors that precede 
them, the majority held.  Trials can even cause cognizable injury, as 
when going to trial more than tripled Cooper’s sentence.35 
Measuring prejudice will sometimes be difficult, requiring counter-
factual speculation.  First, as the majority held in both cases, a de-
fendant must prove with a reasonable probability that he would have 
accepted a more favorable, lapsed plea offer but for counsel’s ineffec-
tiveness.36  Where a defendant pleads guilty only after the prosecution 
reveals the strength of its case, for example, it may not be clear what 
he would have done absent that knowledge.37  Second, prosecutors 
have discretion to withdraw executory plea offers, and courts need not 
accept plea bargains.  Reviewing courts, the majority held, must thus 
find that there is a reasonable probability that neither the prosecution 
would have withdrawn the offer nor the trial court would have reject-
ed it.38  Intervening events, such as a defendant’s new crimes, may 
suggest that the prosecution would have withdrawn the offer or that 
the court would not have accepted it.39 
The real world of plea bargaining is dynamic, sensitive to context, 
and frequently off the record, as the majority noted.  Negotiation is an 
art reflecting varied styles, and it is done beyond direct judicial super-
vision.40  In Frye, the State of Missouri stressed the difficulties that 
prosecutors and courts face in learning about and rectifying out-of-
court incompetence, which is cloaked by attorney-client privilege and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the 
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006)). 
 33 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385, 1387. 
 34 Id. at 1385–88. 
 35 Id. at 1386. 
 36 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389. 
 37 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411. 
 38 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385, 1389–91; see also Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410–11. 
 39 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404–05, 1410–11 (detailing Frye’s later crime). 
 40 See id. at 1408 (citing Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011)). 
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subject to no clear standards.41  Those problems of contextual stand-
ards and off-the-record facts are not new, however.  Strickland re-
quires defense attorneys to provide minimally competent assistance 
even when pursuing their clients’ interests outside of court.42  Strick-
land claims after trial frequently challenge pretrial failures to dig up 
mitigating evidence,43 and they often depend on the evolution of “pre-
vailing professional norms”44 such as those reflected in ABA and state 
bar standards. 
Thus, to define the scope of defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment 
duty, the majority looked to ABA and state bar standards, as well as 
state and federal case law, to distill defense counsel’s obligation to 
communicate formal plea offers to clients promptly.45  And it suggested 
ways for prosecutors and trial courts to guard against false claims 
made with the benefit of hindsight.  For instance, formal offers can be 
documented, written down, and placed on the record for use in later 
proceedings.  Arizona, California, and New Jersey have already devel-
oped such procedures.46 
The majority’s approach gives reviewing courts broad discretion in 
deciding how to remedy Sixth Amendment violations.  Courts must 
tailor remedies to redress constitutional injuries without conferring 
windfalls or wasting resources.47  Here, the injury is a lengthened sen-
tence and sometimes more serious convictions, so trial courts must ex-
ercise discretion in vacating pleas, accepting new pleas, and resentenc-
ing.48  Sometimes, they may need to consider vacating post-trial 
convictions, granting remittitur (in effect) to lower post-trial sentences, 
or even ordering prosecutors to re-offer lapsed pleas.49  The goal is to 
restore the prosecution and defense to the positions they would have 
been in but for the constitutional violation.50 
The majority’s approach to separation of powers is flexible.  It fa-
vors checks and balances by a range of institutions.  As noted, it relies 
on bar authorities and case law to flesh out defense lawyers’ obliga-
tions.  It encourages prosecutors, trial courts, and rules committees to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 Id. at 1406–07. 
 42 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 43 Id. at 675–76; see, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 516–18, 524–25 (2003); Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–96 (2000); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). 
 44 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
 45 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
 46 See id. at 1408–09. 
 47 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388–89 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364–65 
(1981); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)). 
 48 Id. at 1389, 1391. 
 49 Id. at 1389. 
 50 See id. at 1388–89. 
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explore various ways to make records of plea offers.51  And it author-
izes trial judges to be creative in fashioning novel remedies, even when 
those remedies impinge on prosecutorial discretion by requiring prose-
cutors to reissue lapsed plea offers.52 
One other hurdle for the Court in Lafler was that Cooper was a 
state prisoner before the Court on federal habeas review and the Court 
was therefore bound by AEDPA’s deferential standard of review.  That 
standard limits the federal habeas court to deciding whether the state 
court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”53  The state court observed that Cooper 
“knowingly and intelligently rejected two plea offers and chose to go to 
trial.”54  That statement, as the majority read it, conflated a defend-
ant’s knowing and intelligent plea decision with the totality of the 
Strickland inquiry55 and thus failed to apply the correct legal stand-
ard.56  Furthermore, according to the majority, the state court mis-
characterized Cooper’s claim as criticizing his counsel for failing to se-
cure a more favorable bargain.57  Thus, the state court’s ruling was 
contrary to Strickland; it applied the wrong rule of law.  That reading 
avoided deferential review of whether the state court’s application of 
clear law was unreasonable.58  Moreover, the State conceded deficient 
performance, and one can read the state court’s opinion as ignoring the 
prejudice to Cooper’s ultimate sentence.59  In short, the majority ap-
pears to view Lafler as a straightforward application of Strickland’s 
longstanding command,60 thereby avoiding the retroactivity forbidden 
by AEDPA. 
2.  The Dissenters’ Classical Model: Criminal Procedure as Jury 
Trial. — Justice Scalia’s dissents in Lafler and Frye are implicitly 
originalist and formalist.61  Assistance of counsel, he posited, is entirely 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–09. 
 52 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389, 1391. 
 53 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
 54 People v. Cooper, No. 250583, 2005 WL 599740, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2005) (per 
curiam). 
 55 See supra p. 156. 
 56 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390. 
 57 Id.; see also Cooper, 2005 WL 599740, at *1. 
 58 Nancy J. King, Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 29, 29–33 (2012), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/06/19/king.html. 
 59 See Cooper, 2005 WL 599740, at *1. 
 60 See supra p. 156. 
 61 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Tri-
umph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005); 
Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 2, at 1121–22 (explaining how Justices 
Scalia’s and Thomas’s originalism and formalism have led them to a hands-off approach to plea 
bargaining). 
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about ensuring a fair trial.62  The Sixth Amendment addresses the 
fairness only of convictions, not of bargaining.63  Defendants have no 
right to plea bargains (or effective bargainers) and deserve no remedies 
for ineffective counsel.64  Plea bargaining is “a necessary evil [rather 
than] a constitutional entitlement,”65 because it turns criminal justice 
into a “casino[], giving each player a fair chance to beat the house, that 
is, to serve less time than the law says he deserves.”66 
In Justice Scalia’s eyes, then, trials and post-trial sentences remain 
the norm.  Regulation is a binary on/off switch, protecting the right to 
a jury trial but not to the lenient windfall of plea bargaining.  The 
Constitution strictly polices jury verdicts and maximum sentences but 
not plea bargains or sentences below the maximum.  Having pleaded 
guilty, Frye had no constitutional claim — indeed, he had admitted his 
own guilt, so his conviction was indisputably correct.  And having 
gone to trial and received a statutorily authorized sentence, Cooper 
had no constitutional claim either.67 
The dissenters also criticized the majority’s innovation as novel, 
mushy, and unclear.  This “whole new boutique of constitutional juris-
prudence (‘plea-bargaining law’)” remains murky, as it fails to specify 
the proper remedies, and lower courts will struggle to define its con-
tours.68  It is far from clear, for example, how courts will define de-
fense lawyers’ duties in a way that accommodates the variety of styles 
and approaches to plea bargaining.69  Justice Scalia also castigated the 
majority’s “unheard-of” remedy as too discretionary and incoherent.70  
The majority stretched the Court’s ineffective-counsel precedents, he 
submitted, in violation of AEDPA’s deferential standard of review on 
federal habeas.71  The dissenters read the state court’s opinion in 
Lafler as reciting Strickland’s standard correctly and applying it rea-
sonably to find no inadequate representation and thus no cognizable  
prejudice.72 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 62 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1393 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (stressing that Strickland’s purpose is “to ensure a fair trial” (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984))). 
 63 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 64 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1394–95, 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. at 1397. 
 66 Id. at 1398. 
 67 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 68 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392, 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 69 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 70 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1396–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing as “extraordinary” the 
majority’s statements that statutes, rules, and judicial discretion should shape the proper remedies 
for constitutional violations, and that sometimes there might be no remedy at all). 
 71 Id. at 1395–96. 
 72 Id. 
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That line of objections leads to a final one, grounded in the separa-
tion of powers.  Though plea bargaining merits regulation, Justice 
Scalia submitted, that regulation has nothing to do with the Sixth 
Amendment.  It is for legislatures, not courts, to develop 
nonconstitutional remedies, by for example disciplining attorney in-
competence.73  Both Justice Scalia’s and Justice Alito’s dissents evince 
concern about judges’ abilities to regulate prosecutors’ bargaining be-
havior.74  As Justice Alito noted, requiring prosecutors to re-offer re-
jected plea offers as a remedy could undercut courts’ and prosecutors’ 
efforts to husband their scarce resources by encouraging early pleas.75 
II.  BACK TO THE FUTURE:  
HOW MUCH HAS CHANGED AND WILL CHANGE? 
In the short term, Lafler and Frye will matter less to the court sys-
tem than one might expect.  Though they reflect a significant jurispru-
dential debate, in practice their holdings are unlikely to upset many 
convictions or disrupt other aspects of judges’ day-to-day work, pace 
Justice Scalia.  As this Part explains, most circuits had already been 
applying the basic approach that the Court adopted in Lafler and Frye 
with few problems, few defendants will muster the necessary proof to 
demonstrate ineffective plea-bargaining assistance, judges are natural-
ly disinclined to overturn convictions, and judges are unlikely to dis-
pense overly generous remedies.  Defendants must hope not so much 
for judicial redress after the fact as for other actors’ proactive reforms 
to ensure competent advice in the first place, as Part III discusses. 
The dissenters and majority offered starkly different accounts of 
how radical Lafler and Frye are in theory and what they will alter in 
practice.  The dissenters, viewing the cases through originalist lenses, 
understood these cases as radically breaking with the Court’s historical 
focus on jury trials and innocence.  As Justice Scalia put it, “[t]oday’s 
decision upends decades of our cases, violates a federal statute, and 
opens a whole new boutique of constitutional jurisprudence (‘plea-
bargaining law’).”76  According to his dissent, the Sixth Amendment 
and Strickland are limited to assuring fair trials and convictions, but 
the majority’s decision shatters that limitation.77  Lafler applied its 
novel holding retroactively upon federal habeas review, he objected, 
notwithstanding AEDPA’s deferential standard of review.78  And the 
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 73 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 74 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1398–99 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 75 See id. at 1399 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 76 Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord id. at 1391 (“[T]he Court today opens a whole new 
field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”). 
 77 See id. at 1392–95. 
 78 Id. at 1395–96. 
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majority’s discretionary “remedy [is] unheard-of in American jurispru-
dence — and, I would be willing to bet, in the jurisprudence of any 
other country.”79  Indeed, according to the State, these radical new de-
cisions could open the floodgates to a raft of novel, dubious prisoner 
claims.80  Even discounting for Justice Scalia’s hyperbole, these are 
forceful charges. 
The majority, however, portrayed its approach as applying the set-
tled law of Strickland and prevailing professional norms to a new 
problem.  Various precedents had held that fair trials did not suffice to 
cure other errors, such as grand jury errors.81  Strickland’s goal of en-
suring a “just result,” the majority explained, concerns the reliability 
not only of convictions but also of sentences, even for guilty defend-
ants.82  Finally, the majority discounted the State’s floodgates concern, 
noting that similar rules have existed for three decades without caus-
ing a flood of claims and that prosecutors and judges can guard 
against fabricated claims.83 
Jurisprudentially, each side has a point.  The truth lies somewhere 
in between, but the majority has the better of the argument.  The ma-
jority’s substantive approach is not so much an innovation as an un-
flinching application of Strickland to a circumstance it had never be-
fore addressed.  Strickland has long required courts to apply prevailing 
professional norms as guideposts (not rigid requirements) of attorney 
conduct, and of late the Court has been enforcing that requirement 
with increasing vigor.84  Lafler and Frye may be part of this trend that 
may be reinvigorating Strickland; they are hardly departures from it.  
The decisions did come as a surprise to many observers — but largely 
because the Court showed that it meant what it had said.  
Like their jurisprudential point, the dissenters’ practical fears are 
not unreasonable.  Lafler’s retroactivity holding means that these deci-
sions will apply not only on direct appeal but also upon federal habeas 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 79 Id. at 1396. 
 80 Id. at 1389 (majority opinion) (citing Brief for Petitioner at 20, Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (No. 
10-209)). 
 81 Id. at 1386.  Contra id. at 1393 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting that the majority was 
relying on precedents interpreting rights other than the right to effective counsel, rights that do 
not require proof of prejudice to establish violations). 
 82 See id. at 1385–88 (majority opinion) (citing, for example, Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 
365, 379–80 (1986), which recognized a federal habeas petitioner’s right to effective counsel in 
moving to suppress illegally seized evidence, even though that evidence may serve as factual proof 
of guilt, Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388). 
 83 Id. at 1389–90. 
 84 For Strickland’s settled requirements, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984).  For the Court’s recent, vigorous enforcement of Strickland, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 
S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510, 522 (2003); and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000).  
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review, notwithstanding AEDPA’s and Teague v. Lane’s85 bars to retro-
activity.86  Thus, prisoners can use Lafler and Frye to challenge con-
victions and sentences that became final years ago, raising fears of 
opening floodgates. 
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, Lafler and Frye are unlikely to 
free many prisoners, for four reasons.  First, these decisions recognized 
ineffective-assistance standards that most federal courts and bar au-
thorities were already applying without evident problems.  Ten federal 
circuits have already applied rules consistent with the majority’s rule, 
without causing obvious disruptions.87  National and state bar authori-
ties as well as courts developed those norms to require defense lawyers 
to communicate plea offers promptly to their clients.88  Thus, the core 
rule has already proven to be workable, and in many jurisdictions it 
does not change the law. 
Second, defendants will find it very hard to satisfy both Strick-
land’s performance and prejudice prongs under Lafler and Frye — 
just as they do under Strickland itself.  Strickland’s performance 
standard is so lax that any “lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effec-
tive.”89  Courts are understandably wary of Monday-morning quarter-
backing and deferential to the varied approaches to plea bargaining, 
which often reflect local knowledge and experience.90  When in doubt, 
they interpret attorneys’ omissions as tactical decisions to triage and 
conserve resources and credibility, rather than as negligent over-
sights.91  Frye and Lafler were especially egregious cases of deficient 
performance: Frye’s lawyer entirely failed to communicate a formal, 
written plea offer to his client for more than a month, while Cooper’s 
lawyer misadvised him that because he had shot his victim below the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 85 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 86 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (limiting federal habeas review to state convictions that 
had unreasonably misapplied or contravened law that had been clearly established at the time by 
the U.S. Supreme Court); Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (holding that new rules of criminal procedure 
ordinarily do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review).  The parties did not brief 
Teague and the Court did not discuss it, but Lafler’s retroactivity holding under AEDPA should 
apply with equal force to defeat Teague bars as well. 
 87 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385, 1389–90; see Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 39 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1097. 
 88 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
 89 Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM 
M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE 
(1998)). 
 90 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408; Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011). 
 91 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (requiring “highly deferential” judi-
cial review and erecting a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance; that is, . . . [that it] ‘might be considered sound trial strate-
gy’” (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955))). 
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waist, the prosecution could not prove his intent to murder.92  Few de-
fendants can prove such gross incompetence. 
Additionally, Strickland’s prejudice requirement lets courts excuse 
even gross deficiencies so long as they did not affect the outcome.93  
Defendants will find it hard to prove that prosecutors would have left 
plea offers on the table and that judges would have accepted proposed 
bargains, and thus that defendants would ultimately have benefitted 
from the proposed bargains.  That prejudice is especially difficult to 
prove when new facts or litigation developments have intervened.94 
Third, judges are naturally skeptical and loath to overturn convic-
tions and sentences, particularly final ones.95  That judicial inclination, 
whether conscious or unconscious, reinforces the difficulties of proving 
deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland.  Judges are in-
clined to credit an officer of the court over a convicted felon who im-
pugns his lawyer’s performance.  Appellate and habeas courts are un-
derstandably skeptical of the flood of post hoc, self-serving claims 
raised by defendants who were convicted at trial and regret their deci-
sions not to plead.96  Judges hear so many boilerplate claims of ineffec-
tiveness that they risk disregarding the valid ones as well.  As Justice 
Jackson famously put it: “It must prejudice the occasional meritorious 
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.  He who must 
search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that 
the needle is not worth the search.”97 
Moreover, in hindsight, defendants’ decisions to proceed to trial 
may seem to have been inevitable, in keeping with psychological stud-
ies of hindsight bias and the confirmatory bias.98  Plea decisions are 
especially likely to seem inevitable in hindsight because challenges de-
pend on off-the-record evidence that is hard to prove.99  Few defend-
ants have documentary or other evidence that their attorneys did not 
tell them of a plea offer or gave them incorrect advice.  Given the dif-
ficulty of proving such claims and satisfying both of Strickland’s 
prongs, few Strickland claims of any sort succeed, let alone fabricated 
ones.100  Defendants will succeed only where egregious, provable inef-
fectiveness causes palpably longer sentences. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. 
 93 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 94 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409–11. 
 95 See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 [hereinafter Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight]. 
 96 See id. at 4; see also Lynch, supra note 87, at 41. 
 97 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). 
 98 Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight, supra note 95, at 2–3. 
 99 See id. at 4. 
 100 See id. at 1 n.5; see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389–90 (reporting an absence of flood of 
claims or windfalls over the last three decades); Lynch, supra note 87, at 42. 
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Fourth, even when injured defendants do prevail, judges are un-
likely to overcompensate them; if anything, they may undercompen-
sate them.  The Lafler and Frye majority opinions leave judges broad 
discretion to decide what remedy to select or, indeed, whether to 
award any remedy at all,101 and judges are unlikely to err on the side 
of leniency.  Trials paint vivid portraits of defendants’ crimes, provid-
ing a wealth of damaging evidence that necessarily colors judges’ later 
sentences.  Other events may also bring new, damaging facts to light, 
such as Frye’s post-plea-offer crime, and judges need not necessarily 
ignore those facts.102  Judges may take into account the substantial re-
sources that courts and prosecutors have had to expend to try a 
case,103 as well as the burdens on witnesses, the exposure of confiden-
tial informants, and the like.  Thus, even when they award relief, 
courts’ remedies are unlikely to be windfalls. 
Given Strickland’s extreme deference to attorneys’ strategic deci-
sions, the difficulty of proving off-the-record bargaining behavior, and 
habeas courts’ reluctance to reverse final convictions and grant sub-
stantial remedies, Lafler and Frye probably will free few inmates from 
prison.  The dissenters’ floodgates fears are thus overblown.  Many 
prisoners will file claims, but few will succeed, and the cases of those 
prisoners who do succeed will mostly involve egregious ineffectiveness 
and grave prejudice.  Courts will dismiss the many meritless claims 
quickly and without wasting much time, as they dismiss many  
ineffective-assistance claims today.  But, as I predict in the next Part, 
Lafler and Frye will likely spur other institutions to reform plea  
bargaining. 
III.  SOLUTIONS BEYOND THE COURTS 
While judges are unlikely to remedy ineffective assistance after the 
fact, other actors are better positioned to forestall or remedy poor ad-
vice going forward.  In his Frye dissent, Justice Scalia complained that 
the majority usurped the role of legislatures in regulating plea bargain-
ing and enacting tailored remedies.104  But in fact, the majority opin-
ions in Frye and Lafler leave plenty of room for other institutions and 
may even prompt them to act.  Lafler leaves much to the discretion of 
trial courts in fashioning remedies,105 and to appellate courts, legisla-
tures, and rules committees in guiding that remedial discretion.  Frye 
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 101 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388–89. 
 102 See id. at 1389 (declining to direct judges to disregard later information). 
 103 See id. at 1398–99 (Alito, J., dissenting) (expressing hope that lower courts will take these 
factors into account). 
 104 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389, 1391. 
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likewise suggests that these actors, as well as prosecutors, can experi-
ment with various reforms to guard against false claims made with the 
benefit of hindsight.106  In contrast to Justice Scalia’s static approach 
to the separation of powers, the majority envisions dynamic, fluid col-
laboration among various branches and actors.107 
Lafler and Frye thus raise three related issues (one predictive, one 
descriptive, and one normative) concerning how various criminal-
justice actors will, can, and should reform plea bargaining prospective-
ly.  First, I analyze the various actors’ incentives and powers and find, 
surprisingly, that even prosecutors have strong incentives to promote 
and safeguard plea bargains.  Thus, I predict that these decisions will 
spur actors to reform the process.  The majority’s approach seems less 
likely to shut down reforms than to draw attention to and jumpstart a 
stalled process.  Second, I sketch out the range of possible and feasible 
reforms.  Finally, I praise the likely direction of development.  Plea 
bargaining has existed for centuries and been dominant for decades.  It 
is about time that courts spurred other institutions to act. 
A.  Analyzing Actors’ Incentives and Predicting Spurs to Reform 
Some of the most important solutions, I suspect, will come from 
prosecutors.  That conclusion is highly counterintuitive, like trusting 
foxes to guard henhouses.  At an adversarial trial, prosecutors’ inter-
ests are largely antithetical to those of defendants.  Even though their 
job is to do justice, not to win convictions, their adversarial outlook at 
trial makes them poor guardians of defendants’ interests.108 
Nevertheless, prosecutors now have the right incentives to help 
their erstwhile opponents.  Plea bargaining today is fundamentally not 
adversarial but collaborative (some would say collusive).  The world of 
criminal justice has been transformed from a gladiatorial ring to a ne-
gotiating table, and that transformation has revolutionized the parties’ 
incentives.  The quasi-market forces at work encourage all parties in-
volved to work together to achieve plea bargains that benefit all par-
ties directly involved.  Prosecutors have strong self-interests and insti-
tutional interests in disposing of their cases quickly and consensually, 
so they can pursue other cases or lighten their own workloads.109  
When they make plea offers, they want defendants to receive them, 
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 106 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–09. 
 107 See supra pp. 156–67; see also Stephanos Bibas, Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment Prag-
matism, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at Part III.A) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library). 
 108 See Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the 
Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 131–32, 140–42 (Carol S. 
Steiker ed., 2006). 
 109 Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 3, at 2470–71. 
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understand them, and accept them.  Misadvice or nonadvice that hin-
ders that process thwarts case dispositions, creating backlogs and more 
work for prosecutors.  And errors in plea bargaining breed appeals and 
habeas petitions, extra work by which no prosecutor wants to be 
haunted long after a conviction.110 
Thus, prosecutors have incentives first to persuade defendants to 
accept their plea offers, and second to make clean records to bullet-
proof their convictions on appeal and habeas review.  In plea bargain-
ing, unlike at trial, their interests largely align with those of defendants 
and the system.  Both prosecutors and defendants are worse off if inef-
fective defense lawyering obstructs favorable deals.  Not only do pros-
ecutors have the incentives to prevent defense incompetence, but they 
also have the means.  Prosecutors are closely involved in individual 
cases, and they themselves extend plea offers.  They are best posi-
tioned to prevent and counteract errors. 
Many of those same incentives will spur other actors to collaborate 
on reforms.  Trial judges have strong incentives to clear their own 
dockets by encouraging defendants to accept deals and making those 
deals bulletproof.  Defender organizations need to resolve large vol-
umes of cases quickly and finally while forestalling charges of attorney 
incompetence later on.  Advisory rules committees and bar associations 
comprise judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers, who share the in-
centives discussed above.  Legislatures likewise favor plea bargaining 
as a cheap, fast way to ensure public safety by locking up criminals.111  
Lafler and Frye give all of these actors strong incentives to ensure that 
defendants receive plea offers and understand them well enough to ac-
cept them. 
These surprising incentives track those created two years ago by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,112 which recog-
nized noncitizen defendants’ right to receive accurate information 
about deportation before they plead guilty.113  In Padilla’s wake, some 
prosecutors’ offices began giving defendants written warnings, listing 
the types of convictions that could trigger immigration consequenc-
es.114  Some judges began orally warning defendants, at arraignment 
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 110 See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 742 (2011) (“Prosecutors must have assurance that a 
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 111 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
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 112 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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or plea hearings, about immigration consequences, verifying that their 
lawyers had advised them, or even inquiring into defendants’ immi-
gration status on the record.115  Bar associations, public-defender or-
ganizations, courts, and public-interest groups began training defense 
lawyers and advising judges on Padilla.116  Some public defenders be-
gan cultivating in-house immigration experts among their attorneys 
and staff, as well as changing arraignment procedures and providing 
guides and checklists for defense lawyers to follow in preparing cas-
es.117  Public-interest groups provided guides, checklists, and charts to 
foster Padilla compliance, and one even offers a hotline to assist de-
fense lawyers who may lack in-house support.118  The American Bar 
Association has been developing guidance for prosecutors and defense 
lawyers on their obligations post-Padilla.119  Likewise, the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has recom-
mended augmenting the rules governing plea colloquies to put Padilla 
warnings on the record.120 
In other words, Padilla sent a seismic shock through the system.  It 
woke up a wide range of actors and prodded them all to address a 
problem that they had largely ignored until then.  And in many ways, 
Lafler and Frye present even more promising areas for reform than 
Padilla.  Padilla warnings risk discouraging guilty pleas, or at least 
slowing them down, by advising defendants of the disadvantages of 
taking a plea.  On their face, they cut against the parties’ incentives to 
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 115 E.g., id. at 7; IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT & N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 
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dispose of their cases, but the desire to do the right thing and to obtain 
bulletproof convictions has trumped the fear of impeding pleas.  Lafler 
and Frye remedies cut the other way, harnessing the parties’ existing 
incentives to secure final pleas.  They should elicit even greater semi-
private efforts to ensure that defendants learn about the advantages of 
plea offers in order to induce them to accept favorable pleas. 
B.  Surveying Possible Reforms 
There are many ways to improve the quality of defense lawyering.  
Most obviously, legislatures could attack the well-known systemic 
problems plaguing indigent defense.  Appointed defense counsel are 
underfunded, have little support, and need better training and incen-
tives to attract and retain experienced counsel.  Legislatures could 
fund many more public defenders, paralegals, investigators, and the 
like, so that lawyers could juggle fewer cases and focus more on each 
one.  These structural solutions, however, would cost plenty of money, 
and criminal defendants are an unpopular constituency, so change is 
unlikely any time soon. 
Other institutions are more likely to enact less ambitious, more tar-
geted reforms.  Some steps are obvious, simple, and cheap.  Prosecu-
tors can reduce plea agreements to writing, in plain English, and cc 
clients when they send those agreements to defense lawyers.  Prosecu-
tors can also send defendants and their lawyers letters setting forth 
their understandings of the likely guideline sentences after trial or a 
plea, as well as of any enhancements that may apply.121  And they can 
write liquidated-damages-type clauses to provide for various contin-
gencies, such as the possibility that new evidence comes to light or that 
a defendant commits another crime.  That process would prompt de-
fendants and their lawyers to focus on those contingencies and discuss 
them. 
But prosecutors can do much more.  In particular, they can hold so-
called reverse proffer sessions.  In a proffer, the defendant comes to the 
prosecutor’s office to tell what he knows.  In a reverse proffer, the de-
fendant remains silent.  Instead, the prosecutor explains how the gov-
ernment would convict the defendant at trial and may choose to reveal 
more information than required by the discovery rules.122  Prosecutors 
could do something similar to sell recalcitrant defendants on plea of-
fers, by explaining both the likelihood of conviction and the expected 
sentence after a trial versus a plea.  Defendants could ask a few ques-
tions, and even a ten-minute conversation could accurately communi-
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cate the prosecutor’s offer and the strengths of his case.  It would not 
be necessary to hold reverse proffers for all defendants but only for the 
small fraction who resist accepting favorable offers.  Prosecutors could 
even audiotape or videotape reverse proffers.  Taping would facilitate 
judicial review and forestall belated claims that defendants had never 
received offers or had not understood them. 
Supervisors in public-defender organizations and criminal-defense 
law firms can also pursue reforms.  They play a crucial role in training 
new lawyers and providing feedback to experienced ones.  They can 
periodically consult with their line attorneys on cases and sit in on a 
few of them.  After cases end, supervisors can audit random samples of 
them and solicit feedback from clients (as well as prosecutors and 
judges) on how lawyers can improve.  And supervisors can use this in-
formation in hiring, firing, pay, and promotion decisions, to weed out 
the weakest lawyers. 
Advisory rules committees could redraft Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11 and analogous rules governing plea colloquies in state 
court.  Amendments could have judges inquire, at pretrial conferences 
as well as at plea colloquies, whether any plea offers had been made, 
communicated, and discussed with counsel.  Amended rules could 
provide for reducing all formal plea offers to writing and for including 
them in the court record.  They could also loosen the current ban, ef-
fective in a majority of jurisdictions, on letting judges participate in 
the discussion of or share their views on plea offers.123 
Even in the absence of new rules, judges can enact many of these 
practices on their own.  Perhaps they can interpret bans on participat-
ing in plea bargaining narrowly and at least explain, neutrally, the 
terms of plea offers.  Particularly if rules let them participate, they can 
go further to debias defendants and counteract their overoptimism, 
providing accurate information about conviction rates and expected 
sentences for similar crimes, or even restrained advice.  Such measures 
could partly offset judges’ inability to pry into privileged attorney-
client conversations, during which defense lawyers may offer bad  
advice (as in Lafler).  Sentencing commissions could assist judges and 
defense lawyers by compiling conviction and sentence statistics for 
common crimes and translating them into easy-to-grasp graphics. 
Bar organizations can do more too.  They draft and update various 
disciplinary rules, ethical canons, and standards of practice to define 
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lawyers’ professional obligations.  They can require their members to 
learn these rules as part of bar exam preparation and continuing legal 
education.  They can develop training materials and checklists specifi-
cally for prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers, both to instruct 
new lawyers and to keep experienced ones from overlooking their obli-
gations to advise their clients of plea offers.  And they can embarrass, 
suspend, or even disbar attorneys who violate their obligations, partic-
ularly when errors are repeated or egregious. 
C.  Praising Extrajudicial Reforms 
The previous sections describe the parties’ incentives and means to 
reform plea bargaining and predict that they will act on those incen-
tives to reform the system.  Now it is worth exploring why these de-
velopments are desirable.  
The basic justification for Lafler and Frye comes from Justice Ken-
nedy: Today, plea bargaining “is the criminal justice system.”124  For 
the Sixth Amendment to remain meaningful in the real world of guilty 
pleas, defense lawyers must provide minimally adequate assistance in 
plea bargaining and sentencing, not just at the occasional jury trial.  
The right to effective counsel should extend to the amount of punish-
ment, not just the fact of guilt.  Fair trials do not automatically wipe 
away grossly ineffective plea bargaining and the heavier sentences that 
result.125  Thus, Lafler and Frye rightly spur other actors to prevent 
and fix these injustices. 
Moreover, extrajudicial reforms will help to ensure that convictions 
are fair and accurate.  The Sixth Amendment presupposes a vigorous, 
effective adversarial system to test not only defendants’ factual guilt 
but also their culpability and the sentences they deserve.  That adver-
sarial testing requires defense lawyers to probe prosecutors’ cases, 
dicker over their offers, and advocate for the most favorable outcomes 
available in the plea-bargaining market.  Other actors, including judg-
es and prosecutors, can help defense lawyers to do their jobs well, 
backstopping them where they fall short.  More collaboration can only 
help to alleviate the uneven quality of criminal defense. 
Thus, Lafler and Frye stand to improve criminal justice.  A partic-
ular defense lawyer’s incompetence can lead to a much longer sen-
tence.  Lafler and Frye are far from panaceas for sloth, ineptitude, and 
overwork, but they do provide a remedy for some of the worst incom-
petence, and they prod other actors to pursue further reforms.  The re-
sult should be sentences that are tied more to the strength of the evi-
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dence and the severity of the crime and criminal record than to irrele-
vant tactical failures.  That focus better serves the core purposes of 
punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and reform.  As 
long as we have a system of plea bargaining, the merits should matter 
more and lawyers’ skill should matter less. 
Finally, the extrajudicial reforms likely to be prompted by Lafler 
and Frye can work well because they go with the grain of plea bar-
gaining, not against it.  They do not seek to squelch bargains that the 
parties desire.  On the contrary, they ensure that clients know about 
those bargains and the advantages of taking them.  Thus, they com-
plement prosecutors’, judges’, and defense lawyers’ existing incentives 
to clear their dockets and strike mutually advantageous deals. 
Nevertheless, critics might reasonably object, on four grounds, that 
it is not the Court’s business to provoke other actors to reform plea 
bargaining.  First, a critic could complain that the Supreme Court has 
recognized an obligation that belongs to defense lawyers but has forced 
others to pay the price of this obligation.  Prosecutors, judges, bar as-
sociations, and others, rather than the defense lawyers who are at 
fault, will have to work to accommodate Lafler and Frye in order to 
forestall appellate reversals.  Indeed, in Frye, the State cast the issue as 
unfairness to the State in that the court was “subject[ing] it to the con-
sequences of defense counsel’s inadequacies.”126 
That objection misses the mark.  True, Lafler and Frye obligate on-
ly defense counsel to provide accurate advice.127  They do not directly 
obligate prosecutors, judges, and others.  But, in a sense, the entire 
criminal justice system bears the obligation of ensuring fair, accurate 
convictions.  The Sixth Amendment does not confer rights on states, 
but on “the accused” “[i]n all criminal prosecutions.”128  The right to 
counsel, like the other trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, 
is more than a negative right against governmental interference.  Just 
as it must provide speedy, public trials in front of juries, with compul-
sory process and confrontation, the state must also take affirmative 
steps to provide defendants with effective counsel.129  Brady v. Mary-
land130 requires prosecutors to turn over favorable evidence material to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of any prosecutorial wrongdo-
ing.131  Likewise, judges are obligated to ensure that defendants under-
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stand the rights they are waiving by pleading guilty.132  These actors 
can also backstop defense lawyers, offering accurate information or 
even second opinions and answering defendants’ questions without in-
truding on their privileged conversations.  Ours is no longer a true ad-
versarial system, but a plea-bargaining market.  Encouraging the 
sellers of pleas to explain their prices clearly and transparently and the 
arbiters to verify the explanation of those prices is not too much to 
ask. 
Second, the dissenters raise legitimate separation-of-powers con-
cerns.  Traditionally, prosecutors secure grand jury indictments to 
bring charges, petit juries convict, and judges sentence.  Prosecutors, 
not judges, decide what charges to initiate and which to dismiss.  
Thus, ordering the prosecutor in Lafler to reoffer the lapsed plea of-
fer133 appears to intrude upon prosecutorial discretion.  One could of-
fer the same objection to prodding other actors to come up with new 
solutions. 
But today, grand juries are rubber stamps, petit juries are absent in 
most cases, and prosecutors use mandatory minimum and maximum 
sentences to tie judges’ hands.  Charging is now convicting, which is 
sentencing.  Plea bargaining itself has undermined these checks and 
balances, and judges need to use their remedial powers to restore some 
semblance of balance, however imperfect.  The job of the judge is to 
impose a sentence based primarily on the need for retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and reform, not one dictated by grossly incompe-
tent lawyering.  The separation of powers does not require judges to 
abdicate their sentencing power to charge-bargaining prosecutors and 
inept defense counsel.  If anything, rectifying bad defense lawyering 
helps to ensure the adversarial check presupposed by the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Third, Judge Rakoff objects that Frye and Lafler create perverse 
incentives, encouraging defense lawyers to push their clients to plead 
too early.134  Defendants, he notes, are best served when their lawyers 
invest a bit of work to develop factual and legal defenses in order to 
strengthen their bargaining positions.  That background work in-
creases the chances that they will strike more favorable plea bargains 
or discover defenses that enable them to prevail at trial.135  Inadequate 
financial resources and crushing caseloads already encourage many 
criminal defense lawyers to push clients to plead early, which weakens 
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their bargaining position.136  Frye and Lafler, Judge Rakoff complains, 
exacerbate lawyers’ incentives to plead cases out too early instead of 
investing more work, because waiting might occasionally lead to worse 
results and belated claims of ineffectiveness.137 
Ineffective assistance claims, however, rarely succeed and will not 
warp defense lawyers’ incentives.  Judges and commentators know 
that waiting involves taking a calculated risk of a worse result, and 
calculated risks do not always pay off.  As the Court has recognized, 
“[p]lea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with 
uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices 
in balancing opportunities and risks” when deciding whether to take 
an early bargain or hold out for a better one.138  Defendants routinely 
raise ineffective-assistance challenges to whatever decisions their coun-
sel have made, and courts just as routinely brush these challenges off 
as 20/20 hindsight or Monday-morning quarterbacking.139  That is 
doubly true in guilty-plea cases, in which the lack of a trial record puts 
all the more emphasis on deference to counsel’s judgment.140  Such in-
effectiveness claims are already so unlikely to succeed, so prevalent,141 
and thus so devoid of stigma, that it is hard to imagine defense attor-
neys lying awake at night in fear of their disgruntled clients’ filing 
them.  (Criminal litigators, both prosecutors and defense counsel, are 
generally made of sterner stuff.) 
Fourth, the late, great William Stuntz might have argued that con-
stitutionalizing this area of law will, perversely, harm defendants.  As 
he famously contended, the Warren Court sought to help criminal de-
fendants by constitutionalizing vast swaths of criminal procedure.142  
But these new rights have had unintended consequences, encouraging 
legislatures to broaden criminal laws and give prosecutors more bar-
gaining chips, diverting attention from innocence, favoring well-off de-
fendants with well-funded counsel, and increasing the hydraulic pres-
sures to plead guilty and waive rights.143  One might fear the same 
here: seemingly beneficial plea-bargaining rights might discourage 
prosecutors and defense counsel from negotiating and so impede pleas. 
Predicting the future is hazardous, and unintended and unforeseen 
consequences may yet arise.  But the hydraulic-pressures story seems 
much less likely to recur here.  The Warren Court’s failing was invent-
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ing gold-plated rules for criminal trials when in fact most defendants 
can and do waive those trial rights quite easily.  Lawyers naturally 
turned these constitutional guarantees into plea-bargaining chips.  
Lafler and Frye, by contrast, expressly addressed the plea-bargaining 
world that already prevails.  Put another way, the Warren Court rights 
pushed against the grain, toward more elaborate trials.  Lafler and 
Frye, however, are about ensuring that the parties know about and 
consider pleas, which the lawyers are naturally inclined to encourage 
anyway.  The cases reinforce the actors’ incentives and customary dis-
positions rather than attempting to rewire them. 
Finally, the Warren Court’s approach epitomized old-style  
command-and-control regulation.144  It told judges and prosecutors 
precisely how they were supposed to conduct fair trials, regardless of 
how cumbersome or revolutionary the new procedures were.  But 
Lafler and Frye operate more like market incentives.  They require ef-
fective advice but do not micromanage how defense lawyers, prosecu-
tors, judges, and others may ensure and convey that advice.  Strick-
land authorizes experimentation, and the Court is appropriately 
deferential to prevailing professional norms, practices, and varied ap-
proaches.145  The more flexible the legal standard of compliance, the 
less hydraulic pressure there is to evade it.  The Court’s more relaxed 
approach, creating incentives and then allowing semiprivate ordering 
to respond, may paradoxically make reform more successful and less 
likely to be evaded or ignored. 
The greater risk is not that Lafler and Frye will demand too much 
but that they will demand too little.  Courts could easily water down 
Lafler and Frye as they have watered down Strickland, diluting incen-
tives to reform.146  To keep these decisions meaningful, bar authorities 
and others must vigorously explicate prevailing professional norms and 
experiment in order to discover and promulgate best practices for plea 
bargaining, developing consensus approaches over time.  Courts will 
find it easier to follow those trends than to lead them. 
CONCLUSION 
Plea bargaining has semiprivatized public justice.  That explains 
why the parties prefer it as a fast, cheap, discreet, consensual resolu-
tion that leaves prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges all better off.  
That very semiprivate aspect also explains the many legitimate objec-
tions to plea bargaining: it commodifies justice, mutes its trumpet, ex-
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cludes central and supporting actors, and bypasses the cathartic moral-
ity play of a jury trial.147 
Lafler and Frye do not try to budge these hard facts, nor will they 
overturn many convictions.  They do, however, tackle some of the 
worst errors that are hidden by the absence of a public record.  Courts 
can do more to build records and to craft flexible, creative remedies.  
But other actors are better suited to experiment with a range of ways 
to convey, explain, and document plea offers.  Right now, everything 
rests on defense counsel’s shoulders, but defense lawyers are overbur-
dened, underfunded, and of course fallible.  The state bears an obliga-
tion to ensure that defense lawyers do their jobs.  Prosecutors, too, can 
take steps to guard against the worst defense lawyering, acting not just 
as partisan warriors but also as guardians of justice.  And because 
prosecutors share defendants’ interest in resolving cases, they have the 
right incentives to convey, explain, and document their offers.  Those 
extrajudicial remedies resemble semiprivate governance.  Prosecutors, 
judges, supervisory defense lawyers, bar authorities, rules committees, 
and other actors can serve as backstops for defense lawyers who might 
fail to do their jobs. 
We can no longer pretend that we live in a well-functioning, fully 
adversarial system of justice with equally competent opponents.  Plea 
bargaining is collaborative, and defense lawyers make mistakes.  To 
make the Sixth Amendment meaningful in the real world of guilty 
pleas, courts must harness or at least spur other actors to pursue re-
forms that courts alone cannot.  That process does not violate the sep-
aration of powers.  On the contrary, it makes checks and balances 
meaningful again in an opaque system that has largely eroded them. 
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